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INVESTOR-OWNED FIRMS
1.  Introduction
Cooperatives and investor-owned firms  (IOFs) are alternative  forms
of business organization that operate in the  same economic system and
perform similar functions.  Cooperatives, like IOFs, buy, sell and
produce  goods and services, but cooperatives, unlike IOFs,  aim to
provide a service to  their member patrons rather than earn a return on
an investment.  The difference  in objectives may be  attributable to  the
origin of cooperatives.  In market economies,  groups  of producers or
consumers have formed cooperatives when they became dissatisfied with
the conduct of investor-owned firms.  Cooperatives have thus been viewed
as  a tool for correcting market failures1, such as  those  found in the
agricultural sector with its thin and spatially distributed markets.
Indeed, Nourse,  in his concept of cooperatives as a competitive
yardstick, felt cooperatives should exist in order  to eliminate
monopolistic excesses of profit-oriented firms2.
The  issue addressed in this research is  whether the difference in
objectives between cooperatives and investor-owned firms outweighs  the
effect of the similarities  in business functions.  This question is
examined through comparative analysis  of financial performance of
cooperatives  and investor-owned firms  in two food industries  in  the US
agribusiness  sector - fruit and vegetable processors and dairy product
manufacturers.  Agribusinesses are chosen as  the  research base becauseof the prominence of cooperatives in agriculture.  In the last decades,
nearly 30% of all farm products and 20% of all farm inputs  in the US
were handled by cooperatives, and in some states the cooperative share
is  as high as  50%. 3
Comparative performance evaluation of cooperative  and investor-
owned agribusinesses  has been the subject of several recent US studies.
A series of surveys conducted at Purdue University examined the
performance through an analysis of financial statement data and opinion
surveys of members4. The survey results  indicated that some cooperatives
paid slightly higher prices to producers  than IOFs,  farmers ranked the
level and quality of services provided by their cooperatives higher than
the similar services provided by IOFs,  and small cooperatives compared
favorably to IOFs with respect  to profitability.  Overall, however,
there were few significant differences in financial performance  for the
two firm types.
In another study, Chen, Babb,  and Schrader5 examined the growth of
agricultural cooperatives  and IOFs  in the US food sector.  They found
that cooperatives had lower profitability, higher leverage, and higher
growth rates than comparable IOFs.  These results were obtained,
however, without separating the US  food sector into  its component
industry groups and without controlling for firm size.
More recently, Parliament, Lerman,  and Fulton6 compared the
performance of cooperatives and IOFs within one specific industry  group
in the US  food sector - the dairy industry - and found, in contrast,
that cooperatives had higher profitability and lower leverage  than
2comparable IOFs.  Lerman and Parliament7 subsequently studied the
performance of large and small agricultural cooperatives in four
distinct industry groups.  They found, without comparison to  IOFs,  that
financial performance of cooperatives differed significantly across  size
and industry categories.  Specifically, the dairy cooperatives and the
fruit and vegetable processing cooperatives were found to occupy the  two
extremes of the cooperative performance scale, with dairies performing
significantly better and fruit and vegetable processors significantly
worse than farm supply and grain cooperatives.
The apparent differences  in the performance of cooperatives across
industries may be the result of industry-related effects. For  instance,
the relatively poor performance of fruit and vegetable cooperatives
might be in line with the performance  of IOFs  in the same industry.
This study analyzes the comparative performance of cooperatives  and IOFs
in the fruit and vegetable processing industry and in the dairy
industry.  To control for the previously observed size effect7 , the
present study focuses only on "small"  firms with average asset size not
exceeding $100 million for both the cooperatives and the  IOFs.
The paper is  organized as  follows.  Sec.  2 outlines the initial
hypotheses regarding the performance of cooperatives relative to IOFs,
followed by the description of the  data and the methodology in Sec.  3.
The empirical results are presented in two sections:  Sec. 4 discusses
the findings of financial ratio analysis, and Sec.  5 examines the growth
of cooperatives and IOFs  in the  two industries.  Concluding remarks are
presented in the last section.
32.  Implications of the Theory of Cooperative Behavior for Comparative
Performance of Cooperatives  and IOFs
The  theory of cooperative behavior suggests fundamental
differences  in objectives and business strategy between cooperatives and
IOFs.8-10  Differences in objectives and strategy should lead to
observable differences  in profitability, capital structure, and
operating efficiency of cooperatives and IOFs.
With respect to profitability, cooperatives,  in contrast to  IOFs,
are seldom regarded as rate-of-return maximizers: cooperative members
expect to receive benefits through services provided by the cooperative,
such as  lower input prices or better marketing channels, and not through
return on investment9. Cooperatives thus  can be expected to have lower
profitability than IOFs.
With respect to  capital structure, at least two factors suggest
that cooperatives can be expected to have a higher proportion of debt
than comparable IOFs.  First, cooperatives are frequently viewed as
"equity bound":  they cannot issue common stock to.raise equity from
nonmembers and the  direct infusion of equity by members  is usually very
small11. Cooperatives  therefore may need to rely more heavily on debt
financing than IOFs  in order to  sustain comparable growth rates.  Second,
cooperatives and IOFs may differ in their attitudes toward risk.  The
cooperative principle of risk sharing and mutual responsibility may be
interpreted by cooperatives as providing an "insurance policy" in case
of adverse business outcomes10 . Recent findings indeed suggest that a
financially strong cooperative may be encouraged to merge with a weaker
cooperative to prevent the  latter's bankruptcy1 2 . Cooperative decision
4makers thus may be susceptible to moral hazard behavior and willing to
assume higher levels of risk than the managers of  "uninsured"  investor-
owned firms.  Since it  is  the risk of bankruptcy and default that
prevents  IOFs from assuming excessive debt levelsl3 , cooperatives  can be
expected to borrow more heavily than IOFs and have lower safety margins
against the risk of defaulting on debt service and current liabilities.
With respect to  operating efficiency, as measured by the
utilization of assets  to generate sales, moral hazard considerations
also suggest that cooperatives may be  less discriminating in undertaking
investments  than IOFs.  Thus,  cooperatives may have a tendency to
"overinvest,"  forming an asset base greater  than the asset base of IOFs
for the  same level of sales.  "Overinvestment" on the part of
cooperatives may also arise  from differences  in the evaluation of the
opportunity cost of equity funds.  Since members usually do not expect a
direct return on their investment  in the cooperative, cooperatives may
treat members' equity as  costless  funds, without acknowledging their
opportunity cost.  Undervaluing the cost of equity may encourage
excessive  investments, leading to lower efficiency of asset utilization
and higher asset growth rates  for cooperatives  than for  IOFs.
Overinvestment need not be restricted to fixed assets:  it can also
affect current assets, resulting in higher levels of inventory for a
given level of sales.
The various hypotheses suggested by the theory of cooperative
behavior can be  tested by analyzing standard financial ratios for
cooperatives  and IOFs.  The attitude  of cooperatives  toward return on
members' investment can be deduced by comparative examination of the
5rate of return to equity.  The argument that cooperatives are likely to
carry higher debt levels  than IOFs because  they are  "equity bound" and
susceptible to moral hazard behavior can be tested by a comparative
examination of the debt  to equity ratio.  The implications  of moral
hazard behavior can also be tested by comparing the solvency and
liquidity of cooperatives  and IOFs,  as measured respectively by the
ratio of earnings  to interest payments and by the ratio of current
assets to  current liabilities.  The claim that cooperatives tend to
"overinvest" can be tested by comparing the ratio of sales  to fixed
assets and the asset growth rates in cooperatives  and IOFs.  Comparison
of  inventory turnover ratios provides a test of overinvestment in
current assets.
The profitability, capital structure, and operating efficiency
ratios used in this  study are defined in Table 1. The  table also
indicates  the expected relationships of these ratios  for cooperatives
and IOFs.
3.  Data and Methodology
The data for this  research included a sample of 18  cooperatives:  9
cooperatives specializing in canned and frozen fruits, vegetables, and
juices and 9 dairy cooperatives processing fluid milk and manufacturing
value-added dairy products, such as butter, cheese,  ice cream, and
yogurt.  Fruit and vegetable cooperatives  that are mainly wholesalers of
fresh produce and dairies that mainly sell fluid milk were excluded from
the sample.  The  financial ratios of the cooperatives were calculated
from their audited annual reports for  the period 1976-1987.  For each
6observation year,  the median of each of the  six financial ratios was
calculated for each of the  two cooperative  industries.  Two  time series
of 12 median observations were thus  obtained for each ratio - one for
the fruit and vegetable cooperatives and the other for  the dairy
cooperatives.
TABR  1:  Expected Relatiomnhips Betwen  Finanoial Ratio Measures of Performance for Cooperatives  and Investor OMned Fir
Performance  Ratio  Definition  Expected criteria 
relationship
Profitability  Rate of return  Profit before tax*  Coop <  IOF to equity  Net worth**
Leverage  Debt to equity  Total liabilities  Coop >  IOF
Net worth**
Solvency  Coverage ratio  ODerating Earnings***  Coop <  IOF
Interest
Liquidity  Quick ratio  Cash +  Receivables  Coop <  IOF
Current.  liabilities
Efficiency  Fixed asset  Sales  Coop <  IOF turnover  Fixed  assets
Efficiency  Inventory  Cost of Goods Sold*  Coop c IOF turnover  Inventory
*  Some of the fruit and  vegetable  processing cooperatives  that operate  on  a  pooling basis  do not report cost of goods  sold, and  their  "bottom  line"  on  the  income statement  is  therefore  not  comparable  to profit  before  tax  for other  cooperatives and  IOFsa.  In  these  instances,  cost  of  goods  sold  was  estimated  from  the reported cash payments to members during the year. These are  mostly payments  for produce delivered to the cooperative and are  thus conceptually identical to cost of goods sold  in conventional accounting.  Given the estimate for cost of goods  sold, profit before tax was calculated in  a  standard  way to  provide a figure comparable  to  that for other  firms.
The  rate  of return  to  equity  is  defined  in  terms  of profit  before  tax  in order to ensure consistency with  the available data  base  for IOFs. The use of the before-tax rate of return to  equity may be justified for the purposes  of the present comparison because of possible  differences in tax treatment between  cooperatives and IOFs.
**  The net worth of the cooperatives is  the total equity as reported in their financial statements.
***  Earnings before interest and tax (EBIT).
7The financial data for IOFs were obtained from Robert Morris
Associates Annual Statements Studies  (RMA)14 ,  which report a selection
of median financial ratios  for a wide range of industries.  IOFs with
operations comparable to  the dairy cooperatives were represented by the
Dairy Product Manufacturers category (SIC nos.  2021-24, 2026),  which
does not include firms primarily engaged in sales of bulk milk.  No
single  IOF category matched exactly the operations of the fruit and
vegetable processing cooperatives,  and therefore two industrial
classifications were used:  Manufacturers of Canned and Dried Fruits and
Vegetables  (SIC nos.  2033-34) and Manufacturers.of Frozen Fruits,  Fruit
Juices, and Vegetables  (SIC no. 2037).  In addition to being comparable
with respect to the  scope of operations,  all the firms were of
comparable size - less than $100 million in average total assets.
To detect significant differences between cooperatives and IOFs,
the 1976-1987  time series of the median financial ratios  in each
industry were analyzed using the nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis  test 15
("one-way analysis of variance by ranks").  The test ranks the pooled
median financial ratios in the different firm categories in each
industry and forms the sums of the ranks  for  the pooled sample.  If the
rank sums,  or the average scores,  are sufficiently different between the
IOF and cooperative categories, the test rejects the null hypothesis
that the median financial ratios are the  same for the  two types of firms
and establishes that, with a certain probability, the cooperatives  and
IOFs  in a particular industry have different median financial ratios.
Moreover, the average rank scores in each category can be used to
8determine  if the performance measures of cooperatives  are greater or
less than those of IOFs.
4.  Results of Financial Ratio Analysis
The  1976-1987  time series of the six median ratios  for
cooperatives and IOFs  in the  two  industries are presented in Figure 1.
The  thick solid lines plot the cooperative ratios and the broken lines
plot the IOF ratios.  Separate time series are shown for the two  IOF
industrial classifications  to which the  fruit and vegetable cooperatives
are compared.
Panels a-c  in Figure 1 present  the three ratios related to
profitability and capital structure - the rate of return to equity, the
debt to equity ratio, and the ratio of operating earnings to  interest.
In the fruit and vegetable processing industry, the  three ratios for  the
IOFs overlap the corresponding ratios for the  comparable cooperatives.
The Kruskal-Wallis  test indicates that these three median ratios are not
significantly different for  the cooperatives and IOFs  in the  fruit and
vegetable industry.  In the dairy industry,  the rate of return to equity
(panel a) is  also not significantly different between IOFs  and
cooperatives, but both the debt to  equity ratio  (panel b) and the
earnings  to interest  ratio (panel c) are significantly different.  By
both ratios,  the  dairy cooperatives outperform the dairy IOFs - the debt
to equity ratio  is  lower and the earnings  to interest  ratio is  higher.
The three median ratios related to current operations  (panels d-f
in Figure 1) reveal significant differences  in cooperative and IOF
performance in both industries.  The differences, however, are  in
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Fig.  1:  Median  financial  ratios  for  cooperatives  and  IOFs  in  the
fruit  and  vegetable  and  the  dairy  industries.
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Fig.  1:  Median  financial  ratios  for  cooperatives  and  IOFs  in  the
fruit and vegetable  and the dairy industries  (continued).
11opposite directions.  The ratio of sales  to fixed assets  (panel d)
indicates  that fruit and vegetable cooperatives were consistently less
efficient in utilizing their fixed assets to  generate sales  than IOFs,
whereas  the dairy cooperatives were more efficient than the comparable
IOFs.  The  inventory turnover  (panel e) indicates  that fruit and
vegetable cooperatives were carrying higher levels of inventories
relative to  sales  than the comparable  IOFs,  whereas the dairy
cooperatives were carrying lower  inventory levels relative  to  sales  than
the dairy  IOFs.  The quick ratio, defined as  the ratio of liquid current
assets  to current liabilities  (panel f),  was consistently higher for
dairy cooperatives than for comparable IOFs, whereas  for fruit and
vegetable cooperatives  it  was lower than for IOFs  over most of the
years.  These quick ratio comparisons indicate  that dairy cooperatives
maintained a higher liquidity level, while the fruit and vegetable
cooperatives maintained a lower liquidity level compared to  IOFs  in
their industry.
Table 2 summarizes the comparative performance findings.  Contrary
to  the relationships  suggested by the  initial hypotheses  (Table 1),
cooperatives  in both industries were not found to be inferior to
comparable  IOFs by the  rate of return on equity, the  debt to equity
ratio, and the  ratio of earnings to  interest.  In contrast, the  three
current operations measures observed for the  fruit and vegetable
cooperatives were consistent with the hypotheses that suggest lower
performance  for cooperatives  than for comparable IOFs.  The dairy
cooperatives, on the  other hand, performed significantly better than the
dairy IOFs by the  three  current operations measures.
12TARLE  2:  CoparisCo  of  cooperatives  and IOFs  in  the fruit and vegetable  and the dairy industries
Ratio  Fruit & Vegetables  Dairy
Profitability  and  Capital Structur
Rate  of  Return  to  Equity  Coops  IOFs  Coops  ~  IOFs
Debt  to  Equity  Coops  ~  IOFs  Coops  - IOFs
Operating  Earnings
to  Interest  Coops  "  IOFs  Coops  >  IOFs*
Current  ODerations
Sales  to  Fixed  Assets  Coops  <  IOFs*  Coops  >  IOFs*
Inventory  Turnover  Coops  <  IOFs*  Coops  >  IOFs*
Liquid  Current  Assets  to
Current  Liabilities  Coops  <  IOFs*  Coops  >  IOFs*
The corresponding  ratios are significantly different  between  cooperatives and  IOFs  at  0.05  significance  level  by  the  Kruskal-Wallis  test.
The  results  indicate  that  the  previously  observed  poorer
performance  of  the  fruit  and  vegetable  cooperatives  compared  to
cooperatives  in  other  industries7  cannot  be  attributed  solely  to
industry-specific  factors.  An  examination  of  the  distinctive  features
of  cooperatives  and  IOFs  in  each  industry  is  required  in  order  to
account  for  these  differences.
It could be argued that the higher sales to fixed assets ratio and
inventory turnover for  the dairy cooperatives  is caused by a higher
proportion of fluid milk sales  for cooperatives than IOFs.  Fluid milk
sales do not require  as high a level of fixed assets  as value added
processing and, being perishable, generate a higher turnover rate than
processed products.  Indeed, as  the dairy cooperatives  shifted into more
13value-added processing during the 1970s,  the proportion of fluid milk
sales declined and the  inventory turnover decreased markedly (panel e).
This trend, however, did not result in a corresponding decrease of the
sales to  fixed assets ratio  (panel d).  The advantage that dairy
cooperatives exhibit relative  to IOFs  in generating sales  from their
fixed assets  thus cannot be entirely attributed to fluid milk sales, and
may be an indication of higher operating efficiency.
Fruit and vegetable processors, unlike dairies, deal with a
variety of nonhomogeneous raw products.  In this  industry, cooperatives
may be at a disadvantage because they have difficulties  controlling the
mix of the members' products,  and inadequate product mix may cause  the
cooperatives to miss market opportunities.  Cooperatives may also suffer
from adverse selection of members, and the  resulting effect on quality
may prevent them from getting top prices  for their products.  In either
case,  the fruit and vegetable cooperatives are unable to maximize sales
for a given asset base, which is  reflected in lower sales to  fixed
assets  ratios and lower  inventory turnovers compared to  IOFs.
Differences  in the quick ratio between cooperatives  and IOFs were
analyzed by examining the balance sheet composition. Cooperatives in
both industries were found to carry a higher proportion of current
liabilities than the comparable IOFs.  For cooperatives, these current
liabilities were primarily funds owed for members' products.  Fruit and
vegetable cooperatives, however, were observed to have a substantially
lower proportion of accounts receivable than the comparable IOFs,  which
accounts for their lower quick ratio.  The dairy cooperatives,  in
addition to the higher proportion of current liabilities,  also carried a
14higher proportion of accounts receivable than the comparable IOFs.  The
relative  increase  in accounts  receivable, however, was greater  than the
relative increase  in current liabilities, which accounts  for the higher
quick ratio of the dairy cooperatives compared to IOFs.
The higher proportion of accounts receivable for the dairy
cooperatives could result from relatively liberal credit terms to
customers.  The cooperatives  apparently support  this policy by delaying
the payments to their members, as  evidenced by their higher proportion
of current liabilities.  This credit policy would enhance their sales,
which is  consistent with the higher sales to fixed assets ratio  observed
for the dairy cooperatives.  For the  fruit and vegetable cooperatives,
on the other hand, the lower proportion of accounts receivable compared
to the  IOFs may reflect more  stringent credit terms  than those adopted
by the rest of the  industry.  More restrictive credit terms may result
in lower sales and thus account in part for the lower sales to  fixed
assets  ratio of these cooperatives.
5.  Fixed Asset Growth
The lower sales  to  fixed assets ratio of the fruit and vegetable
cooperatives  relative  to the comparable IOFs may be interpreted as a
symptom of  "overinvestment".  An alternative way to assess
overinvestment tendencies  is  by examining growth, as firms  investing in
excess capacity are likely to have  relatively high fixed asset growth
rates.
15Mean annual growth rates of fixed assets were estimated separately
for cooperatives and IOFs  in the  two industries (Table 3).  Because of
the limitations  imposed by the available fixed-asset data for IOFs,  the
growth rates were estimated for the "average"  firm in each category:  the
"average" firm fixed assets were determined by dividing the sum of fixed
assets of the sample firms by the number of firms.  The estimation was
carried out by A semilogarithmic regression was ued to  estimate the
growth rates,  assuming the standard compound growth model
FAt - FAo(l + g)t
where FAt stands  for fixed assets  in year t and g is the mean annual
growth rate.  The explanatory variables in the regression included
dummies for organizational structure (cooperatives or IOFs)  and industry
effects  (fruit and vegetable processors  or dairies).
The  test for homogeneity of slopes  indicated that there were no
significant differences between the  fixed asset growth rates of coopera-
tives and IOFs in each industry.  Within organizational categories,  the
dairy cooperatives had a significantly higher mean growth rate than the
fruit and vegetable cooperatives, but there were no significant
differences  in the  growth rate between IOFs  in the  two industries.
Figure 2 plots  the growth of average fixed assets  over time for
the dairy and the  fruit and vegetable industries.  The  graphs visually
confirm the estimated growth rates reported in Table  3:  the growth rates
are not dramatically different between cooperatives and IOFs  in each
industry.  Therefore, the  lower fixed asset utilization of the fruit and
vegetable cooperatives  is  currently the only evidence of overinvestment
by food-processing cooperatives.
16TAULE  3:  HU  MuAXl OmwUth  atb  at of Fixed  As-t.  for Cooperatives  nd XiP  In  the
Fruit and Veetable  *nd the Dairy  Industrie  es timatd from regresio  (1)
Cooperativec  IOFS
Fruit  and  Vegetable*  7.52X  9,X
Dairy  11. IZ**  9.6Z
*  The  two  rOF industry  olassifications  representing  canned  and  dried  fruits  and
vegetables  and  fromn  fruits,  vegetables,  and  Juices  were  both  included  in  the
regression,  a*  a preliminary  analysi  showed  that their asset  growth  rates  were
not  significantly  different.
**  Significantly  different  at  0.05  level  from  the  aetimated  growth  rate  for  the
fruit  and  vegetable  cooperatives  by  the teat  for  homogeneity  of  slopes  in  dummy
variable  regresAion.  All other  growth  rates are  not  significantly  different
from  one  another  at 0.05  level.
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Fig. 2:  Growth of fixed assets of cooperatives and IOFs  in the
fruit and vegetable and the dairy industries (1970 - 100).
17The similarity of asset growth rates between cooperatives and IOFs
is  also relevant for the  interpretation of the debt to  equity findings
(see Sec. 4 and Fig.  1, panel b).  Although cooperative borrowing levels
are lower than initially hypothesized, cooperatives achieved the same
growth rates  as the comparable IOFs, without visible signs of capital
starvation.  Thus,  lack of investment opportunities or externally
imposed restrictions on borrowing cannot by cited to explain why the
cooperative debt was found to be  lower than expected.
6.  Conclusions
The performance comparisons between US cooperatives and IOFs  in
two food  industries do not provide strong evidence in support of the
initial hypotheses which suggested that cooperatives could be expected
to exhibit low profitability, moral hazard behavior, and overinvestment
in fixed assets and inventories.  The rate of return to equity in
cooperatives was not found to be significantly different from that of
IOFs  in the comparable  industries;  the debt to equity and the earnings
to interest ratios for cooperatives were not found to be higher  than for
the comparable IOFs;  and no compelling evidence for overinvestment was
found for cooperatives  in either industry.
The observation that the profitability of cooperatives was better
than expected and comparable  to that of IOFs  cannot be attributed to  a
low equity base in cooperatives.  The proportion of equity of  the
cooperatives was not found to be  lower than that of the comparable  IOFs.
In fact, the dairy cooperatives were observed to have a significantly
lower debt  to equity ratio  than the dairy IOFs, which indicates a
18relatively large equity base.  These results counter the view that
cooperatives are  "equity bound."
The finding that cooperatives, while maintaining the same growth
rates as IOFs,  do not rely more heavily on debt financing and do not
maintain lower safety margins against default  is  similarly inconsistent
with the hypothesis of moral hazard behavior in cooperatives.
On the overinvestment issue, the findings conclusively indicate
that the dairy cooperatives  are not overinvested:  they utilize their
fixed assets more efficiently in generating sales than the comparable
IOFs, while maintaining comparable long-term growth rates.  The
conclusions are not as clear with regard to  the fruit and vegetable
cooperatives.  Their relatively low sales to  fixed assets  ratio  is  a
symptom of overinvestment.  However, there has been a significant
improvement in this ratio over time relative to  the rest of the  industry
(see Figure 1, panel d).  The findings suggest that the extent of
overinvestment, although initially present, has diminished over  time as
cooperatives  increased the utilization of their asset base  to generate
sales.  The  initial overinvestment may be a reflection of the
indivisibility of new investments  in fixed assets made in the early
1970s as  the fruit and vegetable cooperatives moved into more value-
added processing.  The entry into new product  lines may have  involved
unavoidable excess capacity, or  "overinvestment,"  but the utilization of
capacity improved as  sales increased over time.  The lack of clear
evidence of overinvestment  in the  fruit and vegetable and the dairy
cooperatives  conflicts with the findings of Sexton8 , who observed
overinvestment for cotton ginning cooperatives.  This may be another
19reflection of industry effects that have been previously observed to
produce differences  in various performance measures  among cooperatives.
The relatively conservative  capital structure and lack of
overinvestment on the part of cooperatives do not support out the
hypothesis of cooperative susceptibility to moral hazard behavior.  The
immobility of cooperative equity and the members' largely undiversified
investment  in the  agricultural sector may cause cooperative members  to
be more risk averse than IOF shareholders with their more liquid,
diversified portfolios.  As a result, pressure exerted by members may
counteract in part the hypothesized tendency of cooperatives to accept
higher risks.
Lang, Babb,  Boynton, and Schrader 1 6 report  in their survey that
policy makers and university economists felt that there were  significant
differences  in goals between cooperatives and IOFs.  On the other hand,
managers of cooperatives and IOFs ranked their goals essentially the
same.  The findings of  this paper suggests  that the standards of
financial analysis  in the business community may have "forced"
cooperatives to  adopt virtually the same goals as  investor-owned firms,
in line with the views expressed by the  surveyed practitioners.
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